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Abstract 
Romania has consistently scored low in performance assessments of EU hopefuls. 
There is a growing consensus on what the main culprit may be; namely a lack of capacity 
to design, adopt and implement public policies, irrespective of their nature. The 
underlying factors include: a lack of data and coherent administrative procedures, 
distrust of state bureaucracies and among public officials, the tendency of new 
governments to downplay the achievements of their predecessors and spend time and 
effort revising laws and regulations without any form of public program assessment, and 
a 19th century approach to policymaking where judgments in terms of social costs and 
benefits are rare. Despite a political will to adopt new laws and procedures there is still a 
lack of incentives and implementation at the civil service or political level. The author 
discusses the difficulties of policy reform in such an environment, and offers 
recommendations for what the government, independent actors such as NGOs or the 
media, as well as international partners can do in order to change the situation. 
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1 Poor Governance 
Ever since Romania was included in comparative performance assessments that rate 
the transition countries, it has scored consistently poorly, usually coming towards the 
bottom of the table of EU hopefuls. The European Commission annual reports evaluating 
the progress of candidate countries put Romania in last place after Bulgaria, a country 
that, arguably, began the transition facing harsher adverse circumstances. There is a 
growing consensus within both local and foreign analysis on what the main culprit may be 
here, namely a lack of capacity to design, adopt and implement public policies, 
irrespective of their nature. This has created a sense of drift and uncertainty in Romanian 
society, and has demobilized many social actors that might have taken the hardships of 
transition as their own, had they only been given a stable environment. 
This policy shortcoming has also substantially affected the pace of social 
development. Most inherited indicators from previous regimes in all ex-communist 
countries had reasonably high measurements. UNDP measures human development 
through a combination of education, health state and economic output indicators. If 
literacy rates or life expectancy change only slowly in time − and even these showed a 
slight decline only across the region after 19891 − we can say that GDP/cap figures were 
much more volatile, and started the ‘90s with a downwards trend. The lack of consistent 
and sustainable growth in the last decade is largely attributable to domestic policy 
failures. Incorrect institutional provisions, a lack of political will and a lack of 
implementation skills − all can be grouped under the heading weak governance, which 
explains why some countries have fared worse than others here; and Romania has 
definitely lagged behind in this respect. One of the most comprehensive evaluations of 
governing qualities had by nations of the world, run jointly by the World Bank and the 
Stanford University2, only confirms via the use of quantitative data what EU, OECD and 
other international reports have noted beforehand: that there is a ‘governance deficit’ in 
Romania that covers many aspects of public life (Fig. 1). 
Two things are of particular concern in this analysis: 
                                            
1
 The pre-1989 figures are questionable in many countries, and in Romania first of all, due to the propensity 
of the old regime to tamper with statistics.  
2
 Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay and P. Zoido-Lobaton, 2005. Governance Matters IV: Updated Indicators 
1996-2004. The World Bank and Stanford University,  
CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES/INTERNATIONAL POLICY FELLOWSHIPS 2005/06 
 5 
• Romania has, for most part of the transition period, scored least among CEE 
nations as regards quality of governance indicators, being now relegated into the 
second league together with crisis-torn Balkan and CIS countries. 
• Not only is the average score low – also, the quality of governance in Romania 
improved very little between 1998 and 2004. 
No other EU candidate has experienced such a combination of unwelcome 
developments. When the country score as a total is broken down one can see more 
precisely where the problem is. While in political areas (the voice of the 
people/democracy, political stability) things look reasonably good, it is in policy 
implementation areas where the score is pulled down: i.e. as in government 
effectiveness proper and the control of corruption (Fig. 2). In addition, the quality of 
regulation notably worsened between 1998 and 2001 – and this is an important point to 
stress when talking about the first decade of transition in Romania: the country has failed 
to follow up the political liberalization (see voice and accountability in Fig. 2) achieved in 
the early nineties with sound policies. 
 
 
Figure 1 The quality of governance score: trends 1998-2004 
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When something eventually becomes implemented and functions, there are usually 
two reasons why this happens. First of all, because external conditionality was strong 
and detailed enough to keep things on the right track. Such is the case with certain 
measures resorted to, to stabilize and liberalize the Romanian economy, something 
adopted largely in two waves: 1997-98, and after 2001, largely under pressure from the 
EU. Or, second, when a bad crisis suddenly occurs and forces the implementation of a 
solution that has already been long debated (and lobbied for by local actors) without any 
political decision having been reached. Arguably, this is how some of the most important 
policy achievements of the last few years have come about: the passing of the FOIA law 
pushed forward by a consortium of NGOs in 2001, local budgets’ reform, and the 
cleaning up and strengthening of the financial sector after a series of bank and mutual 
fund collapses (which brought the country close to a state of default in 1999). More 
recently, under strong pressure from the Romanian public a very strict law dealing with 
the disclosing of personal assets and interests was put in place in connection with 
dignitaries and civil servants. In some instances a combination of external conditionality 
and crisis-driven measures would lead to action - as was the case with the issue of 
orphans: strong pressure from Brussels and Strasbourg to do something about 
Romania’s gloomy orphanages plus a string of scandals related to international 
adoptions forced the government into action and a more modern system of foster care 
was eventually implemented. 
Figure 2 The quality of governance in Romania: 
developments between 1998 and 2001
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The problem is that these two factors can only work in some policy areas. An external 
or crisis-motivated push may not function with the same efficiency in other areas of 
economic or social policy, where standardized ways of operating do not exist (as they do 
in banking or local finance, for example). Here, domestic expertise is necessary in order 
to be able to filter and adapt locally a pool of internationally-recognized, best practices. If 
the Romanian policy-making community continues to be weak and non-committed, 
things will not change for the better. Right now, there are obvious problems in this respect, 
starting from the very design of the policy cycle. 
2 The Missing Policies Model 
In principle, a robust policy design rests on a rational model of policy-making (define 
the problem, identify and evaluate alternative solutions, choose the optimal one based on 
explicit criteria, implement it and collect feed back). However, the situation in Romania 
reminds one of that of pre-modern states, when a lack of data and coherent 
administrative procedures made large portions of the society “invisible” to top public 
officials3 . Evolution towards a modern public sector implied a systematic effort to 
centralize information, categorize and handle data for policy purposes − hence to “read” 
the society accurately. Yet attempts to develop rational policies using modern state 
bureaucracies may be resisted by citizens if there is distrust among them and among 
public officials; the former may suspect that every attempt to make social transactions 
more “readable” via the use of recorded data and a measuring of social processes will 
lead to more state interference and control, which is regarded as evil. In other words, 
citizens’ trust in public institutions is not only a result of previous experiences with state 
intervention – it is also a factor that affects the very capacity of these institutions to design 
and then implement public policies. Without measures aimed at enhancing the people’s 
level of trust in state institutions, therefore, it is hard to escape this trap created by 
pre-modernity. 
After 1989, there has been little progress in this respect in Romania, although the 
need for effective and rational public policies is now recognized by all mainstream actors. 
The consequences are clear. During communist times both politics and policies, in the 
modern, democratic meaning of the terms, were absent. Two simultaneous 
                                            
3
 JC Scott, 1998, 1998. Seeing Like a State, Yale Univ. Press – quoted in Leslie Pal, 2002. “Public Policy 
Analysis”, in Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina, and S. Ioniţă (eds) Politici Publice: Teorie şi Practică. Polirom, Iaşi, 
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developments were supposed to take place in the public sphere after the fall of the 
communist regime, starting from this zero-base situation: the emergence of democratic 
politics, and development of the design and implementation capacities inherent in public 
policy. In reality, the evolution of the two axes was uneven (Fig. 3) 4, for, after 1989 we 
can argue that Romania has remained stuck in the upper-left quadrant. 
The fall of the old regime caused a rapid move towards political pluralism in the early 
‘90s – though the same development failed to occur on the policies axis. If we agree with 
the distinction that politics is about getting elected, while policy is about what you do 
afterwards, we can conclude that the main interest has been focused on electoral 
campaigns, alliances and splits, positioning and re-positioning, and courting the media. 
All of the modest steps towards professionalization in public life have occurred almost 
exclusively in these areas. The idea that running for office should also involve 
competition among programs and policy packages has still not dawned on Romanian 
politicians, however; and, since campaigning is the only proven skill of the political class, 
it begins shortly after one round of elections are over - consuming financial and 
intellectual resources which, in “normal times”, would be (at least partially) invested in 
policies. Moreover, every new cabinet has a tendency to downplay the achievements of 
its predecessors and then spends time and effort re-writing and revising a substantial 
amount of laws and regulations without running any form of public program assessment 
alongside this. 
                                                                                                                                            
Romania.  
4
 Following a suggestion by Dorel Sandor, 1999. “Politics versus Policies: How to Succeed in Blocking 
Reforms”, in Rühl and Dăianu, Economic Transition in Romania: Past, Present and Future. Cerope, 
Bucharest.  
Figure 3 Incomplete development of the public sphere after 1989 
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One thing that politicians and their advisors have learned to do in the last decade is to 
use and discuss/learn from opinion polls. This is indeed a useful skill in a modern 
democracy since poll data, if used properly, can be a precious source of feedback 
regarding policies. Nevertheless, given an absence of other types of skills and products, 
an over-reliance on polls reinforces the false impression had by politicians that the 
governing process is only about triangulating and influencing public opinion. This is a 
natural bias for East European elites, groupings made up largely of intellectuals with a 
soft spot for expressing themselves in public and acquiring the celebrity status 
associated with this. The whole notion of reform as a list of identifiable steps and 
procedures, characterized by an implementation effort, measurable outcomes and a 
certain level of efficiency still remains rare - and not only among politicians but also for 
much of the public. And so does the idea that all policy cycle components are worth 
studying, not only the initial big idea. 
A very important mental barrier that holds back institutionalization of professional 
analyses is the lack of understanding of the nature of trade-offs in policy decision-making. 
In real life, nothing comes without a cost; well-meant policies have unintended 
consequences, while some of them may be unpleasant. Good policy researchers always 
try to make their analysis as inclusive as possible when balancing the costs and benefits 
of proposed public procedures and ways of moving. 
The Romanian policy community, irrespective of its professional background, has not 
yet assimilated this fundamental notion of trade-offs - which is small wonder: 
socio-human or engineering subjects were (and still are) taught in universities with the 
same disregard for situations where choices must be made between conflicting values 
that all have legitimacy. People still have the impression that optimal solutions are unique 
and can be determined by the best experts in the field using the right technical 
instruments. Whilst one cannot realistically expect a minister to possess the analytical 
objectivity of an academic in evaluating his/her pet project, independent experts should 
know better… Unfortunately, think tank members often advance their agendas in the 
same blindfolded way of a government official, assuming that incompetence or personal 
enmity will be the only sources of disagreement. Moreover, for such persons, too, 
policies are mostly about message and a positioning in the public space - rather than 
about outcomes. 
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The “missing policies model” shown above poses serious problems for the state of 
social development in Romania. Inconsistent governance creates uncertainties for all 
social actors, public and private, and shortens their perceptions of time horizons - with all 
the consequences that follow on from this: a reduced level of trust, proliferation of 
‘hit-and-run’ transactions, a difficult balancing up of factors promoting the public interest. 
It has been said that bad policies can be less damaging than no policies at all. This may 
not actually be true in many cases - but it does illustrate the feelings of many Romanian 
citizens today, after more than one decade of a protracted transition: that anything is 
better than a perceived policy drift, i.e. when no party is able to point to a clear course of 
action. This mood, even if not fully justified in reality, explains why so many voters have 
defected from the democratic camp and have begun to vote in an ‘anti-system’ way! 
What is certain, though, is that policy incompetence and/or political class lack of interest 
is leaving society in a sub-optimal state - where people’s welfare is lower than it could 
otherwise be. 
3 Administrative Problems 
The Romanian policy community embraces an obsolete, 19th century approach to 
policymaking, something being centered mainly in the drafting and passing of legislation. 
A policy is good or legitimate when it follows the letter of the law − and vice versa. 
Judgments in terms of social costs and benefits are very rare. This legalistic view leaves 
little room for feasibility assessments in terms of social outcomes, collecting feedback or 
making a study of implementation mechanisms. What little memory exists regarding past 
policy experiences is never made explicit (in the form of books, working papers, public 
lectures, university courses, etc): it survives as a tacit knowledge had by public servants 
who happened to be involved in the process at some point or other. And as central 
government agencies are notably numerous and unstable – i.e. appearing, changing 
their structure and falling into oblivion every few years - institutional memory is not 
something that can be perpetuated5. This, again, is consistent with the other pre-modern 
features of Romanian public administration, namely as regards: 
• Low capacity to communicate across time and institutions 
• A closeness vis-à-vis independent experts and public opinion 
                                            
5
 Ioniţă, Sorin, 2002. “Expandable Government: Institutional Flaws of the Central Administration in 
Romania”, in Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina, and S. Ioniţă (eds) Public Policies: Theory and Practice. Polirom 
Publishing House, Iaşi, Romania.  
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• Learning exclusively by doing, typically in one agency; as a result, there is very little 
ability had by operators to verbalize and generalize experiences - as well as little 
capacity to adapt to changing circumstances 
• A propensity to secrecy; by default, information should be kept secret because it 
constitutes the only comparative advantage had by an otherwise dispensable 
bureaucrat. 
A combination of political uncertainty and low payment – insufficient as regards 
sustaining a decent level of living, even at modest Romanian standards – creates a civil 
service which is not only less professional than those of developed countries - also, it is 
increasingly displaying a tendency towards duality. The majority of its members are old 
petty apparatchiks - or new dropouts from the private sector. Frustrated by their low 
income but unsure of their own skills to cling to their existing jobs, they duly execute daily 
routines, play bureaucratic power-games and yield to political pressures coming from 
above. 
Conversely, a very different strategy is pursued by a small number of people, too, 
especially in the higher echelons, who regard time spent in the civil service as something 
for their CV, for their political career, or as a step towards a more lucrative job in the 
private sector or with an international organization. Or, they could be driven by a less 
virtuous motivation... Some of them may have been educated in the West and thus 
constitute nuclei of competence within their immediate environment, though their tenure 
will tend to be short - and there will be no long-term impact made on the overall 
performance of the involved institution. These are the persons with whom the typical 
Western donor will meet and talk - hence the widespread impression that the public 
sector situation is better than it really is; for there may be differences in the level of 
professionalization and stability between institutions. It has been noted before that the 
central banks and finance ministries of developing countries, or the Ministries for EU 
Integration in the CEE, for example, are the first to develop “linkage elites”, i.e. who 
speak the conceptual language of Western colleagues. However, their numbers are as 
yet too small to alter the overall picture of the civil service: a mass of disgruntled and 
ineffective staff, punctured with small and transient groupings who do understand and try 
to push reforms forward. Again, giving this dual structure of the Romanian civil service, 
even Western advisors have a hard time interacting successfully with it. Professional 
communication and mobility between the two sectors tends therefore to be low. 
Some things can be accomplished (especially in the first stages of transition): 
non-controversial measures requiring little administrative capacity with regard to 
SORIN IONITA: POOR POLICY MAKING  
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implementation, which are likely to be promoted quickly by a small circle of senior officials 
with political support and not much help needed from outside government (the setting up 
of - basic - democratic institutions, early prices and trade liberalization, the dismantling of 
old regulatory mechanisms). Yet as post-communist reforms entered the second stage, 
where more complex public systems involving many stakeholders would need to be 
changed, the bureaucracy’s coherence becomes crucial - and inputs from independent 
knowledge centers may be decisive. In Romania, while the reforms of type one were 
more or less successfully pressed upon "normal" bureaucracies by the linkage elites and 
political leaders, attempts to implement type two reforms led to bureaucratic sabotage 
and open fighting back against initiators. What is more, when arbitrary and 
politically-driven purges of the civil service occur, like the one mentioned earlier, people 
who make up the small pockets of expertise are the first to disappear from public 
institutions – either because they were most visibly associated with the political sponsors 
of reforms or because they are the most professionally mobile anyway. 
Entrenched bureaucracies have learned from experience that they can always prevail 
in the long run by paying lip service to reforms while resisting them in a tacit way. They do 
not like coherent strategies, transparent regulations and written laws – they prefer the 
status quo, and daily instructions received by phone from above. This was how the 
communist regime worked; and after its collapse the old chain of command fell apart, 
though a deep contempt for law and transparency of action remained a ‘constant’ in 
involved persons’ daily activities. Such an institutional culture is self-perpetuating in the 
civil service, the political class and in society at large. A change of generations is not 
going to alter the rules of the game as long as recruitment and socialization follow the 
same old pattern: graduates from universities with low standards6 are hired through 
clientelistic mechanisms; performance when on the job is not measured; tenure and 
promotion are gained via power struggles. 
In general, the average Romanian minister has little understanding of the difficulty 
and complexity of the tasks he or she faces, or he/she simply judges them impossible to 
accomplish. Thus they focus less on getting things done, and more on developing 
supportive networks, because having collaborators one can trust with absolute loyalty is 
the obsession of all local politicians - and this is the reason why they avoid formal 
                                            
6
 A problem still underestimated by Western donors and analysts, who are more familiar with other parts of 
the developing world where, in spite of social problems and inequality, well-educated elites exist and 
managerial skills are up to Western standards. In spite of the progress of the last decade we are still not in 
this situation in Romania. 
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institutional cooperation or independent expertise. In other words, policymaking is 
reduced to nothing more than politics by other means. And when politics becomes very 
personalized or personality-based, fragmented and pre-modern - as the next section 
explains - turf wars becomes the rule all across the public sector. 
4 Elites’ Habits and Values: “Amoral Familism” 
A consistent layer of values and attitudes prevalent in society serves to stress the 
previously-outlined structural flaws. Personal allegiances are more important than 
anything else, even the rational self-interest of actors. As a result, the environment 
becomes more unpredictable than it would otherwise be. Leaders are supposed to be 
promoters of their protégés; and clan-based loyalties take precedence over public duties 
for salaried public officials. Such behavior can be found not only in the central 
government but also in local administration, the political opposition, academia and social 
life in general, i.e. so it permeates most of the country’s elites. Classic studies of 
Mezzogiorno in Italy call this complex of attitudes “amoral familism”: when extended 
kin-based associations form close networks of interests and develop a particularistic 
ethics centered solely upon the group’s survival7. This central objective of perpetuity and 
enrichment of the in-group supersedes any other general value or norm the society may 
have, which then become non-applicable to such a group’s members. At best, they may 
be only used temporarily, as instruments for advancing the family’s goals − as happens 
sometimes with the anti-corruption measures. 
Since Romanian society, like others in the Balkans, still holds onto such pre-modern 
traits, its members are neither very keen to compete openly nor are they accustomed to 
the pro-growth dynamics of modernity. Social transactions are regarded as a zero-sum 
game; a group’s gain must have been brought about at the expense of others. This may 
be a rational attitude for traditional, static societies, where resources are limited and the 
only questions of public interest have to do with redistribution; the maximization game in 
these circumstances will not be understood in absolute but in relative terms – and what 
may be considered acceptable in the end is when everybody loses something, but one’s 
own group loses less than the others. Yet such a worldview is non-beneficial in the new 
circumstances, where a positive spiral of growth is possible and the professional success 
of out-groups should not be regarded as a threat, but as a source of generalized wealth. 
SORIN IONITA: POOR POLICY MAKING  
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Designing and implementing welfare-enhancing public policies in this environment − 
meaning packages of consistent and uniform general rules that are applicable to 
everyone − is always a challenge. 
In Romania, this secular, institutional under-development has been combined with 
the inheritance of a particular type of totalitarian regime: “sultanistic communism”, as 
transitologists have aptly characterized the Ceausescu-type, unique blend of Soviet-style 
bureaucracy and Balkan-style arbitrariness and clannish behavior. The ruling class of the 
Ceausescu years was made up of a number of territorial families, ones fighting for power. 
Even the formal rules of the communist regime were not consistently enforced. Instead, it 
was an open secret that the competition among groups consisted of applying skills and 
one’s power to bend the rules of the game to one’s own advantage. Rent-seeking was a 
generally accepted principle inherent in the organizing of public life, and all individuals 
down the social ladder were trying - with more or less success - to replicate strategies 
made use of by the top echelons. Naturally, the habit of selective enforcement of rules, 
depending on one's social position, has not been able to disappear without trace in just 
one decade – indeed it has become one of the main problems of today. 
After 1990, the newly-appeared political parties were, typically, made up of small 
groups of people with little or no idea about what the task of ruling a country meant. 
Governing was most often done, more or less routinely, by an uneasy combination of 
old-time Communist bureaucrats (the only persons possessing a group discipline via 
which to accomplish anything) and foreign donors. The emerging civil society, while 
facing more or less the same problems as the rest of the society, has tried to find a place 
for itself in this equation. As the Romanian communist regime was much closer and 
repressive than its Central European counterparts, it did not allow the emergence of an 
alternative elite - or even a decent category of technocrats who could understand and 
manage policy. In a belated response to such a situation, many civil society organizations 
appeared in the early ‘90s and tried to make up, with their radicalism, for the missing 
dissidence before 1989 − they were, so to speak, intellectuals organizing themselves to 
oppose a dead tyrant. This was one more factor that held back the appearance of 
modern, professionally-based think tanks; while the effect on post-communist politics 
was also weak, since these persons did not succeed in discrediting or excluding 
important political and economic actors that were linked with the previous regime. 
                                                                                                                                            
7
 Banfield, Edward, 1958. The Moral Basis of a Backward Society. NY: Free Press.  
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Transition researchers see this as a strong predictor of slow reforms and non-consistent 
policies8. 
Pre-modern attitudes towards public affairs do not necessarily mean that one has to 
be poorly educated or anti-Western. Actually, the correlation is weak between clannish 
behavior and membership to the old regime’s ruling class. The new, post ’89 elites, who 
speak the language of modernity when put in an official setting, can still be discretionary 
and clannish in private. Indeed, such a disconnection between official, Westernized 
discourse abroad and actual behavior at home in all things that really matter has a long 
history in Romania. 19th century boyars sent their sons to French and German 
universities and adopted Western customs in order to be able to preserve their power of 
patronage in new circumstances − anticipating the idea of the Sicilian writer di 
Lampedusa that “everything has to change in order to stay the same”9. Social theorists 
have even explained along these lines why, before Communism, to be an official, a state 
employee or a lawyer was much more common among the national bourgeoisie than to 
become an industrialist or merchant: because, as a reflection of pervasive rent-seeking, 
political entrepreneurship was much more lucrative than economic entrepreneurship. 
This also shows why foreign assistance is many times ineffective in these states, and 
is seldom able to alter the ways of the locals. First, it is no longer an exogenous factor: 
playing on its interests and provoking specific reactions from the international community 
has become a component of local politicking10. Identifying “bad guys” or culprits with 
regard to non- or simulated reforms ignores the structural faults of these societies - and 
also personalizes forces that are deeply entrenched in society. Second, pumping 
resources through assistance programs without prior analysis of local conditions and 
networks of influence often ends up not by changing the rules of the local game but, on 
the contrary, raising the stakes and consolidating existent power groups. Local elites are 
tempted to appeal to the international community’s interests with regard to maintaining 
local stability (as is the case with the European Union), thus emphasizing the presumably 
destabilizing effects of reduced assistance or tougher conditionality. 
                                            
8
 Nelson, Joan, 1995. ‘Linkages Between Politics and Economics’, in Diamond and Plattner (eds) 
Economic Reform and Democracy, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore. 
9
 "Occore che cambi tutto perche non cambi niente", in Tomasi di Lampedusa, 1958. Il gattopardo. This 
also explains why ‘diplomacy’ has been an occupation held in high esteem in our society and is quite 
professionally practiced: because the better you are at it, the more you are able to increase the distance 
between pays légal and pays réel, have fictions accepted by the powerful foreign partners that you depend 
upon, and the more you maximize in-group benefits.  
10
 van Meurs, W., 2001. Risk Reporting 2001/2002 Southeastern Europe. Bertelsmann Stiftung.  
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5 Policy-making Problems 
Some political will now exists to adopt new laws and procedures that are able to 
facilitate technocratic policy selection. Much of this seems to have been driven by the 
carrots and sticks associated with EU accession. Yet the main problem has always 
remained the same: a lack of incentives and implementation, at either the political level or 
in the civil service, geared to strengthening investment programs and budgeting systems 
so as to ensure that allocations are made according to appropriate criteria, i.e. criteria 
that emphasize the consistency of individual projects with high priority national and 
sector-based objectives. There appears to be a pervasive perception that policy choices 
remain highly politicized, with ministers who are most powerful and assertive getting the 
largest allocations as well as the largest allocations of local counterpart funds concerning 
aid-financed projects. Once entrenched at the top, such a system is reproduced at lower 
tiers of government. At present (albeit with some notable exceptions), there seems to be 
limited demand for improved resource allocation efficiency in the budget process taken 
as a whole. 
The flawed policy process here, this being probably the most crucial (and ignored) 
source of poor governance, is characterized by there being few public consultations, 
hasty decision-making and poor implementation capacities. If at all, public debates and 
identification of crucial trade-offs occur after policies have been (or are supposed to be) 
implemented, not before; and this creates uncertainty, confusion and ultimately mistrust 
in public institutions. The immediate symptom of this model of governing by default is the 
large gap between written plans and strategies, on one hand - and social realities on the 
other. Such a flawed decision-making pattern confirms the worst expectations of citizens, 
as it is very permeable to rent-seeking and typically leads to a selective enforcement of 
rules. 
Briefly put, corruption – broadly defined so as to include rent-seeking, state capture, 
deliberate misallocation of public funds and an exchange of favors that can also take 
non-monetary forms – is only a by-product of this flawed policy-making process. This 
being so, there is currently little incentive for citizens to participate in making decisions, 
as long as policies are muddled, inconsistent and ultimately non-binding. Important 
public actions in society occur mostly by default, via formal laws and regulations being 
enforced selectively, after different groups have struggled for the best possible 
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arrangement (that is, the best blend of rules applicable in their case). What we have is a 
vicious circle of weak and distrusted institutions and a non-participating citizenry. 
There is nothing new or peculiar when it comes to transition countries in having erratic 
and opaque policies, an unclear agenda at the top, little public consultation, poor 
coordination, and a weak civil service overstepping its mandate when making crucial 
decisions (by default) in the implementation process. In a book on policies adopted in 
developing countries, Marilee Grindle argued that one of their obvious characteristics is 
that the focus of participation and conflict occurs primarily at either the implementation or 
the output stages11. This contrasts with the experience of the US or Western Europe, 
where the focus rests instead on the input or policy-making stage. She identifies two 
reasons for this difference. First of all, in developing countries there are few 
organizational structures capable of aggregating demands and representing the interests 
of broad categories of citizens. When such structures do exist, they tend to be controlled 
by elite groups. Second, national leaders with influence over the allocation of policy 
goods tend to discourage citizen participation in any policy process as illegitimate, or at 
least as non-efficient. Trapped between weak representation and discouraged 
participation, citizens/groups are thereby forced to engage with the policy process by 
presenting individual demands. So "factions, patron-client linkages, ethnic ties and 
personal coalitions"12 are the most common mechanisms via which to access public 
goods and services. 
Mutatis mutandis, the analysis is instructive when translated into a post-communist 
area of operations. Communism has left behind a tradition of policy-making which does 
not encourage broad or open consultations, the considering and costing-out of 
alternative courses of action, or a balancing up of trade-offs. Instead, the agenda is set 
within a close circle of technocrats and is approved by key political players (who may or 
may not be the same as those making up the official political hierarchy). Formal policy 
laid out at the top is merely a basis for perpetual negotiations – vertical and horizontal13 – 
undertaken by public administration and the political system occurring during the 
implementation stage. Substantial deviations from the original goals are tolerated 
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 Op. cit., p. 18.  
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SORIN IONITA: POOR POLICY MAKING  
 18 
depending on the informal degree of power of each actor involved. Formal policies do 
exist, as do other official norms and regulations - but they tend to be more or less fictional, 
with, many times, public institutions being the first to ignore them. 
When such a system is well-entrenched, policies are (i) numerous and volatile, and (ii) 
designed without regard to feasibility of implementation, as they are not meant to be 
consistently implemented anyway but to be used instrumentally, that is, as weapons in 
power struggles among groups. As said, interests are balanced out not during the 
process of persons’ reaching a decision, but in the implementation process - and the 
most valuable asset in this process is a person’s control over enforcement mechanisms. 
Horizontal accountability bodies – nominally independent institutions, such as the 
administrative judicial system/public auditors – are thus weak and politicized. This 
situation comes close to what has been described in development literature as weak 
governance, and it is arguably an entrenched reality in many transition countries, 
particularly in those of South-Eastern Europe. 
Currently existing, formal and informal public administrative institutions support 
ongoing corruption. Public sector corruption in Romania not only consists in using public 
position for personal gain - it encompasses the widespread infringing of the norms of 
non-personal involvement and fairness (which should be characteristic of a modern, 
public service) to the advantage of more powerful groups. Institutional reforms during the 
transition period did not target this discretion specifically, as civil service reform acts 
prompted by the European Commission include practically no reward or punishment 
system to thereby promote a change in administrative culture. However, building 
transparent institutions and a balanced political system in which no group is able to 
‘privatize’ the administration is the only solution for a problem of poor governance. 
The political will and management commitment needed to make policy choice more 
technocratic, i.e. more geared to the strategic importance and economic rate of return of 
projects, varies greatly across sectors and subsectors - i.e. the demand for technocratic 
as opposed to politicized or ad hoc project/program choice at the national level itself 
varies a lot, but with no strong top-down set of requirements from the highest political 
levels. Also, incentives to strengthen good public management are generally weak 
and/or distorted. As in any country, line ministers and other senior political appointees do 
not appear receptive to new technical approaches that might serve to undermine their 
own objectives. Thus, at least in some areas, the incentives to staff to identify /prepare 
/propose high-return projects and to prevent bad programs are not great. Briefly put, 
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constraints with regard to better policy management and evaluation lie mainly on the 
demand side, both at the national and local levels. The problem is not so much a lack of 
capacity as something that needs to be defined in terms of personnel possessing an 
adequate technical training, i.e. on the supply side. Such capacities may well exist here 
and there, though there may be a lack of requirement to use such capacities, i.e. so only 
good policies are chosen in the first place. The conclusion is that the poor incentives 
represent the most important challenge at this stage. 
A good test for the quality of the policy process would be to see whether there is in 
place an adequate strategic framework to guide the line ministries in deciding what 
program areas to consider in preparing and proposing projects for the budget – which, in 
general, is the key area where clashing priorities and trade-offs need to be settled. A key 
challenge for public expenditure management is, of course, how to prioritize competing 
claims for scarce resources, especially financial resources and implementation 
capacities, in accordance with national objectives and strategies that should “drive” 
sectoral and subsectoral objectives and strategies. Individual projects are just tactical 
instruments that need to be defined within the context of appropriate national and 
sector-based strategies. The basic answer to this question is that, by and large, Romania 
lacks a strategic framework for programming and budgeting. The links between policy 
making, planning and budgeting remain weak, and there is a weak capacity at the center 
(for example, in the Ministry of Finance) to assess the appropriateness of proposals 
coming from line ministries against overall strategic policy objectives. There appears to 
be an ad hoc rather than cohesive and comprehensive approach to management. 
Monitoring, whether for consistency with policy or on actual outcomes and outputs vis a 
vis targeted outcome and outputs, is also deficient. 
There is no functional institutional platform to aggregate different sector-based policy 
measures, although this has been identified many times as a priority - and a lot of 
technical assistance was devoted to its creation. The inter-ministerial committees of the 
cabinet function erratically, failing to address cross-sectoral issues in a systematic way. 
Because they are very numerous and fluid, they are not perceived as important by their 
supposed institutional members, so, many times, junior staff with no decision-making 
power are delegated to take part. Also, the General Secretariat of the Government (a 
permanent body with ministerial status) is in charge of daily management of the cabinet's 
agenda, yet it does not perceive the screening, reviewing or analyzing the individual 
proposals coming from line ministries as part of its operations. Furthermore, it acts only 
SORIN IONITA: POOR POLICY MAKING  
 20 
as a dispatcher of legal documents sent to ministries for consultation, but it does not go 
on to deal with broader, policy documents. As a result, these are absent from the 
government's agenda, which consist almost exclusively of bits of legislation or, at best, 
compilations put together by individual ministries. 
The only mechanism for formal decision-making across sectors remains the weekly 
cabinet meeting. This meeting is overburdened due to a lack of preliminary screening 
and delegation - and this can create bottlenecks. For example, in 2003 the government 
endorsed 2,050 normative acts, at a rate of 40-50 per session. Since no forum for 
resolving conflicts before they reach the government meeting exists, these sessions can 
be very long. There is also the risk that some important implications or trade-offs are 
overlooked, which contributes to the existing tendency to regard laws as only "general 
guidelines" for action, so that they can then be adjusted informally, in accordance with 
reality and in an ad hoc manner, case by case, in the process of implementation. 
The role of the EU as a catalyst for better policy coordination has been uneven: it has 
worked in some sectors, but much less for the government overall. As a requirement in 
this process, the Romanian government has produced a National Development Plan 
(NDP) for 2004-06, and another one is under preparation for the period 2007-13, along 
with companion Sectoral Operational Plans (SOPs)14. These are standard instruments 
that should be developed by all candidate countries. It might be assumed, therefore, that 
such NDPs and the SOPs attached to them would form national and sector-based 
strategies functioning as frameworks for priority-setting at both national, sectoral and 
sub-national levels - and, in turn, as a guide to preparation of the budget as a whole. The 
reality is, however, that current domestic policies are made and implemented absolutely 
independently of the NDP, which is not up to now used to setting priorities - and it is 
unclear if and when these diverging priorities and methodologies will merge. Instead of 
being a comprehensive national strategy where the EU intervenes with financial help in 
some of its chapters, the NDP is, at present, an instrument for programming EU 
Structural and Cohesion funds; and there is clearly a rush to produce new projects to ‘fill 
in the boxes’ agreed with Brussels. There is little communication or coordination between 
persons in charge of resource allocation planning for the NDP and those in the line 
ministries. 
The sheer amount of the foreign assistance available in the last decade – which has 
steadily increased, and will increase even more after 2007 – was, in a way, a strain on the 
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capacities of the public sector. The limited strategic capacity that existed in institutions 
was fully absorbed into the process of programming and running EU projects, and the 
same happened with the limited financial resources not consumed in current operations. 
In consequence, the strategic agenda seems at times to be entirely taken up with the task 
of dealing with foreign assistance (coming primarily from the EU), and the main policy 
‘target’ of authorities becomes a funds’ absorption rate.  
Authorities struggle constantly with their own limited capacities and budgets in order to 
be able to consume everything that is allocated, this being a process that is not easy to 
manage - and which is bound to become even more difficult as the size of Romanian 
assistance increases over time. 
A divide is appearing between public institutions as a result of these developments: 
on one hand, those performing regular tasks which consume a lot of resources but are 
not eligible for foreign funding (social assistance, education, health, but also "routine" 
jobs in other sectors); and, on the other, "innovative" tasks (mainly investments, in 
eligible sectors) which qualify for extra funding. To the extent that the two categories are 
communicating less and less, are following different programming procedures and are 
being administered by different offices, the likelihood of policy integration decreases. 
This divide many times overlaps with – and reinforces – the duality of the civil service (as 
mentioned above, in section 3): a small number of good professionals at the top, who 
tend to cluster where the ‘real action’ is (eligible sectors, working on projects); and a 
mass of bureaucrats administering the rest. 
6 Agenda for Reforming the Policy Process 
Under such complex circumstances, approaching policy reform head-on is no easy 
task; for, as in most governments (like Romania's), there is no clear institutional focus for 
this type of intervention. In spite of the significant attention and resources lately being 
devoted to streamlining this process, a clear mechanism for policy-making has still not 
emerged - and important decisions continue to be made in an ad-hoc, almost 
experimental manner. Sector-based agencies and lobby groups are resistant to 
introducing generally-applicable, horizontal procedures, while the government's agenda 
is fatally driven by emergency interventions and crisis-solving. Moreover, it may be 
difficult to tackle the problems in all sectors at once, even when the strategic 
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shortcomings are similar, due to the varying timetables and feelings of urgency across 
sectors (for example, those helped and those not helped by foreign funds – see previous 
paragraph). 
In addition, we should not start with unrealistic expectations about the completely 
rational nature of any policy process, even in advanced democracies. Most governments 
have loosely defined and often inconsistent objectives that result from the process by 
which they were formulated. In coalition bargaining, it is often impossible to obtain a 
consensus on anything more than broad statements of principle, i.e. so accuracy and 
specificity must be sacrificed. Furthermore, a compromise reached in such negotiations 
would not hold up if the costs and tradeoffs involved were made explicit15. An objective 
ex-ante examination of the feasibility of policies is thus extremely difficult to do in 
government as analysis serving to highlight costs and tradeoffs may threaten the political 
consensus – and the same logic may apply to ex-post assessments and feedback. 
However, if a policy process which is perfectly rational and objective is not possible to 
achieve in reality anywhere in the world, the flaws of the one currently existing in 
Romania are by comparison so obvious that some steps towards this normative model 
will definitely increase its efficiency16.  
Given all the objective difficulties mentioned, what can local reformers do, in 
cooperation with international donors and other local or foreign advisors, in order to 
change the situation? How can they uproot the entrenched groups with a stake in 
perpetuating the missing policies model described in this report, those characterized by 
muddled strategies, opaque resource allocations and the selective enforcement of rules? 
What can reformers do to make a shift from where negotiations are made among interest 
groups at the implementation stage to creating a focus at the formulation stage of policies, 
thus breaking the vicious circle of weak/ineffective policies – low level of public 
participation and accountability? These are important questions because, in practice, 
they all boil down to one simple, but crucial one: how can the historical process of fully 
modernizing these states and societies be accelerated? A number of general principles 
can be referred to for orienting the actions of governments, local independent policy 
analysts or international actors. At the very basic level, one useful way of thinking about 
how to approach issues related to capacities development for better policy management 
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in countries similar to Romania is along the lines suggested by Shah17. New practices 
have been slow to become “owned”, adopted and put in practice so far beyond the 
superficial level that was strictly necessary to respond to conditionality attached to 
broader processes to which the country was committed (EU integration, IMF monitoring, 
etc). This was the case, for example, with the performance-based budget reforms. In 
such situations we need to distinguish among: 
• ability or technical capacity issues that are likely to arise; 
• authority issues; 
• acceptance issues. 
Within this framework, the fundamental point of this report, supported by the 
arguments of previous sections18, is that constraints on improving of policy management 
are to be found firstly in terms of low acceptance (of the legitimacy of new, objective 
criteria and transparency); secondly, in terms of low authority (meaning that nobody 
knows who exactly is in charge of prioritization across sectors, for example) and only 
thirdly in terms of low technical ability in institutions. Historically, both the communist 
legacy (over-extended, technically capable state, but with fluid institutions and negotiable 
rules) and the unfinished modernization before Communism (no Weberian, impersonal 
bureaucracy in place) played a role here. 
The direct implication here is that the main problem in the country’s system is not 
knowledge, but incentives. If this is so, it is unlikely to be fixed by providing technical 
assistance to institutions (training, exchanges, seconding programs, institutional twinning, 
new equipment). If at all, capacity building should go hand in hand with serious efforts to 
increase the system’s accountability. This does not mean that all civil servants are 
equally able and efficient; on the contrary, as was mentioned above, the civil service 
displays a pronounced duality (see sec. 3). Yet the way to deal with the problem is not 
merely by training the bottom half of the bureaucracy – it is to find a way to measure their 
performance, make results public and build pressure for change within the system. For 
example, when reforming the policy-making process most effort should go not into laying 
down detailed rules and guidelines about how powerful ministers should run their sectors 
(which those affected usually tend to ignore) but into splitting the field of policy-making 
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into relevant areas and stages, while finding the most powerful "natural" incentives via 
which officials can change their behavior in each area. 
Prioritization in public programs is fundamentally a political process; it follows on here 
that a strong need for efficiency in resource use at the political level is the most important 
condition for obtaining such efficiency. As said above, a demand for good policy 
identification and evaluation capabilities is more important than the supply of people 
trained in technical skills such as cost-benefit analyses or budgeting skills. If a strong 
requirement is present – and the first openings must be made at the political level – the 
supply can be generated fairly rapidly, especially in ex-communist countries, with their 
well-educated manpower. But if the demand is lacking, then the supply will be irrelevant. 
This is an important thing to note for reformers in this region. 
By promoting transparency and efficiency, reformers make their societies more 
“readable”, as a crucial prerequisite for sound public policy; and the vicious circle of 
distrust between citizens and state (mentioned above) will be broken. Even in societies 
dominated by amoral familism (see footnote 7), most citizens know intuitively that having 
a bureaucracy that is unfair and personalized imposes a tax on everyone's welfare. If 
things change, the competition for rent-seeking which tends to take place when policies 
are being implemented – getting preferential treatment, usually by obtaining a special 
way of proceeding or individual exemptions under a general policy – may be replaced by 
a different type of competition, one for shaping policies at the stage of formulation. While 
the latter is no perfect guarantee against rent-seeking, it usually tends to be more visible, 
i.e. transparent, and involves more numerous and comprehensive constituencies. Thus, 
a practice that might be labeled today as "grand corruption" could be reduced, in favor of 
the legitimate practice of balancing up social interests. 
Everyone can benefit in the long run if the policy-making environment is opened up to 
this second type of competition among interest groups, which is the "right sort" of 
competition. It can reduce rents and improve the overall quality of institutions. When the 
number of trading partners increases, a natural demand for better institutions appears - 
even in societies with a high degree of state ‘capture’, i.e. as good institutions are 
necessary to manage the risk that comes from dealing with numerous and unknown 
individuals who do not belong to one’s in-group. Greater risk and greater opportunities 
thus act together to break the entrenched networks of interest, from outside and from 
inside. Evidence from empirical studies shows, for example, that openness in trade is 
correlated with efficient public goods provision, lower corruption, effective government 
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policies and a strengthened rule of law. The same may be true for the market of ideas 
and policy analysis. 
Measuring the effects of policies is crucial for accountability and for strengthening the 
weakest link of the policy cycle in the region: getting feedback from implementation and 
using it to adjust programs. Nothing focuses the attention more of public players than 
someone ‘keeping the score’ on what they do. In other words, what is not measured does 
not improve. Arguably, it is rare when such a policy circle actually closes at the feedback 
point in countries like Romania (the reasons being discussed above): first and foremost, 
no incentives are forthcoming prompting an institutionalizing of feedback (and when 
assessments are done, there are no incentives pushing persons to give them attention 
and act); and, occasionally, there is simply a lack of capacity. Governments should 
understand that they are able to avoid almost entirely the capacity problem by putting all 
the information they have in the public domain. The "expert public" (think tanks, 
journalists) will pick it up and do such evaluations at zero cost to the budget and, 
hopefully, with an increasing quality over time). They will also disseminate lessons to the 
rest of the public, and thus generate a strong political signal for real change. 
Governments committed to reform should voluntarily engage in such 
‘transparentization’ exercises since, if one is a reform champion fighting the inertia of the 
administration, it is both conceptually and practically easier to disclose the information 
you may have (of mixed quality, scattered across institutions, collected in uncoordinated 
ways, etc) than to set up a public body to aggregate, analyze and use it to inform the 
policy process. This also solves the problem of follow up on well-meant reforms where 
they may disappear into oblivion after a while or never get to be implemented in 
substance as they need to rely on permanent investments in terms of attention and 
resources from the government19. When an independent constituency is created to keep 
the reform alive, this problem is avoided. Governments which are not committed to 
reforms should be subject to public pressure to become so. 
A feasible action plan for reforming the policy process in such environments via an 
operationalizing of the principles outlined above should involve all social partners, 
including the government and its international partners. 
First, the Government should: 
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• Admit that it has a problem with the policy process and recognize its real nature 
(skewed rules of the game, opacity and a lack of incentives, a dual bureaucracy); 
with some help from outside, this can be done; 
• Be willing to spend some political capital on a crucial task that cannot be fixed by 
merely throwing (donors') money at it, and when it cannot be delegated to junior 
ministers or technical advisors; the top political level must be involved, and be seen 
to be involved; 
• In terms of what exactly must be done, accept to open up its own internal processes, 
wherever possible, in order to create incentives for change and a real drive for 
action in the administration; 
Independent actors (think tanks, NGOs, media) should: 
• Regard themselves not only as sources of expertise but, more importantly, as 
enablers – agents working to change the political environment in which public 
officials operate, by measuring the effects of policies, making results public, and 
unleashing the natural pressure of the public to support change; this may at times 
mean confrontation - not only friendly advice; 
• Identifying good performers and poor performers, and morally rewarding the first; 
across-the-board criticism ("nothing works") is not going to change the situation but 
only encourage the adverse selection of poor performers in the public sector; 
• Ultimately, the public should be able to distinguish among poor policy performances 
- and penalize them politically, as this is the only thing that elected officials are likely 
to see and understand. 
International partners should: 
• Dedicate a small portion of their efforts to building up transparency and 
accountability mechanisms so as to assess what is going on in key areas of 
government (i.e. not "information offices" funded by specific donors and attached to 
institutions but, rather, tools via which to make transparent the inner functioning of 
the public sector, primarily in decision-making and resource allocation processes); 
• Avoid strengthening the existing tendency of government to keep important or 
controversial decisions away from the public eye by adding their own layer of rules 
dealing with confidentiality; and all programs evaluations should be made public by 
definition. 
• Avoid worsening the dual-bureaucracy problem, where a few adept and well-paid 
civil servants are absorbed into running government programs and projects 
financed with foreign funds (primarily, EU funds) while important policy areas that 
are not assisted (social welfare, pensions, education, and health to some extent) 
will gradually drop as regards importance. 
Practical instruments with which to implement such an accountability agenda via 
transparency could be: 
• The adopting of Freedom of Information Acts and Decisional Transparency Acts 
("sunshine laws"), whilst making reasonable efforts to enforce them. Engaging 
social partners in a sincere effort to monitor just how these rules are implemented; 
and rewarding the performers - and punishing the laggards. 
• As a rule, all public procurement contracts and their annexes, once they have been 
signed, will be published. There is no better (or cheaper) way of monitoring the 
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integrity of a procurement system, which is a major source of problems at all levels 
of government. 
• Registering and publishing (on a website) the votes of all individual MPs with regard 
to each bill submitted to the Parliament for debate. Without such a thing, all 
discussions about regulating lobbying groups, reforming parties or the electoral 
system will be pointless. 
• Publishing ex officio all declarations of assets and the interests of dignitaries and 
top civil servants; and creating such declaration forms where they do not exist, 
whilst also making them mandatory. 
• Institutionalizing the ex-ante budget auditors, and making such audits public for all 
relevant public institutions during a budget preparation time cycle. 
• Informing the public and opening up the budgetary process to outsiders, with no 
restrictions; of course, very few people will really participate here - though some will, 
and these are likely to be from among the "expert public", which will guarantee the 
dissemination of information considered relevant; moreover, openness in itself will 
act as a deterrent on irregular practices20. 
• Financial transfers for local governments: using automatic, formula-based 
allocation rules as much as possible to increase predictability and avoid clientelism 
at the local level; supplementing this with competitions for grants overseen by 
outside boards21. 
This paper (and research project) has argued that the most powerful instrument for 
reforming policy-making processes and improving governance is accountability through 
transparency. Reformers, whether inside or outside government, should identify a 
number of important policy domains where problems are obvious, and try to find the best 
ways to intervene by prompting public interest and access, which can then create moral 
pressure for change – which, in turn, is the only thing that top officials will pay attention to. 
If we agree that politicians and civil servants are rational individuals who respond to 
challenges and incentives they face, accountability via transparency is the only workable 
way of increasing the political costs of poor performance - and of rewarding the good - in 
societies possessing weak institutions. 
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